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Session IV:  Fair Use and Other Exceptions* 
Stan McCoy 
Let me begin by inviting you to think about the purpose of the trade agreement.  
Contrary to what you might gather from watching our current presidential election, 
a trade agreement is not some kind of business transaction where the U.S. comes to, 
say, New Zealand and says, “Hey, we’ve got a lot of movies, you’ve got a lot of 
powdered milk, let’s do a deal.”   
It doesn’t quite work that way.  Recall some of the words that Probir used this 
morning when he was describing the achievements of the TPP:  ‘coherence,’ 
“consistency,” “stability,” and “transparency.”1  He called it a platform for standards.  
Eric talked about facilitation and harmonization.2  In line with those remarks, you 
can think of trade agreements not as business transactions, but as bargains.  Bargains 
that seek to balance national interests in crafting a shared, rules-based mechanism to 
provide an environment of certainty and transparency so that business transactions 
can occur.  In fact, we value certainty and transparency so much in international trade 
negotiations that even when countries can’t agree to eliminate a trade barrier, they 
often perceive value in just cataloguing it, stabilizing it, writing it down, making it 
transparent, and making sure it doesn’t get any worse.  
One of our main purposes in doing this, as economists have observed, is to force 
governments to internalize to some extent the negative externalities that their 
unilateral policies would otherwise impose on the citizens and businesses of their 
trading partners.3  For example, a country with a very low perceived interest in 
protecting copyrights, especially the copyrights of foreigners, might in isolation 
prefer to permit widespread theft of foreign works, or allow their country to be a 
haven for digital pirates who steal from foreigners.  This would have certain benefits, 
domestically:  lots of free stuff for consumers, and lots of free spending on fast cars 
and expensive watches by pirates who make money off of other people’s works and 
inject that money into the local economy.  But this self-interested approach would 
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produce negative externalities for the creators of those works, and their business 
partners, in the form of uncertainty or outright loss of protection of their property.   
Or, to use a less extreme example, countries like Canada, which, as Ysolde 
confirmed earlier, perceive themselves as net IP importers, might choose to afford 
minimal protection as a matter of self-interest, comfortable that the externalities of 
that policy choice would fall more heavily south of the border than in Canada itself.4  
And indeed, as many speakers have confirmed over the course of the day, the United 
States has an enormous problem with trading partners imposing this sort of negative 
externality on our creators and creative sector businesses.5 
So, bearing in mind the raison d’être of trade agreements, when you approach a 
trade negotiator with the idea of including something in a trade agreement, the 
negotiator is bound to ask, on some level, whether the proffered provision advances 
the national economic interest in certainty and stability.  He or she will be looking 
for evidence that the proffered provision would constrain trading partners from 
imposing some kind of negative externality on the United States. 
With respect to fair use, these have not been particularly easy questions.  Our 
curious American friend, fair use, is 200 years old, but its complexion changes like 
a teenager’s.  As David has observed in the past, the fair use we know today is not 
the one we knew twenty years ago.  Each application is case-by-case, depending on 
how U.S. judges view a particular use in light of U.S. cultural and constitutional 
contexts.  Sometimes the term is used unsophisticatedly or opportunistically as a sort 
of code word for doing whatever one can convince themselves is “fair,” or is not 
unfair.   
The idea of fair use emerged from a very understandable imperative for U.S. 
judges to interpret the U.S. constitutionally-derived copyright protections against the 
backdrop of U.S. constitutional free speech.6  Fair use is a creature in statute but not 
of statute.  We are unsure at any given moment exactly how many limbs this creature 
has.  It seems to have some little vestigial arms like a tyrannosaurus, and one big 
claw like a fiddler crab (in some circuits at least).7  And many have questioned 
whether exporting this curious creature of American law truly advances the national 
economic interest in certainty and stability on the U.S. side.   
There is, some might say, a national interest in attaching a certain vagueness to 
the rights of others with a view to building and sustaining U.S. businesses that seek 
to derive profit from those works in ways that might fall within the ambit of fair use.   
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But apropos of that:  Jonathan’s comment earlier positing this as a contest between 
big media companies who don’t understand the creative process and individual 
creators who need exceptions of fair use,8 reminds me a bit of the comments of H.L. 
Mencken who said, “When some[body says] it’s not about the money, it’s about the 
money.”9   
Make no mistake, there are very big businesses out there looking to profit from 
the exploitation of exceptions and limitations.  And I say that fully acknowledging 
that there is a big role for appropriation and derivation and exceptions and limitations 
in the creative process.   
The “fiddlersaurus rex” of fair use works in the United States because we’ve 
developed an approach to the law that’s tolerant of a high degree of uncertainty, and 
we accept the resulting litigation culture as a cost of doing business.   For many of 
our trading partners, as we found out when the U.S. tabled its proposals on the 
exceptions and limitations in the TPP negotiations, that’s not a bargain that they’re 
really prepared to accept.   
And indeed, if you look at the final TPP language, what it says is that “each party 
shall endeavour to achieve an appropriate balance in its copyright and related rights 
system . . . .”10  And that’s the trading partners saying, “Just because you want me to 
achieve an appropriate balance, doesn’t mean I’m going to change my system for 
you.”  And indeed, other than the U.S., fair use factors have been adopted in only a 
handful of other jurisdictions.  
The vast majority of countries—163 other Berne Convention members and 156 
other WTO members—do not have fair use.11  In these countries, as required by 
Berne, exceptions to the copyright holder’s rights are limited to cases that conform 
to the requirements of the three-step test (certain special cases, and so on).  Most 
other countries have legal systems deriving from the civil law tradition, or mixed 
tradition, where statutes spell out specific exceptions that allow for activities similar 
to those provided by fair use, or fair dealing, but in an enumerated and prescribed 
way.  For countries that follow other kinds of legal traditions, there are some 
important reasons why they might view adoption of fair use as a negative.   
First, there’s the uncertainty.  Interpreting whether an act is fair use is, of course, 
not a simple matter, as everyone in this room knows.  The concept is inherently 
ambiguous, and may be too much so for trading partners whose legal systems place 
a higher value on the role of the law as an ex ante guide to behavior.  One of course 
can argue that they’re wrong to do this, but there are powerful sociocultural 
imperatives that lead many of our trading partners to take a different view about what 
they want their law to do for their citizens.   
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Second, judge-made fair use law is often unsuitable for other kinds of legal 
traditions.  Here in the U.S., we have reference to 200 years of case law in helping 
us understand fair use.  But there’s very little precedent outside the U.S. regarding 
the application of fair use factors.   
Third, it’s unnecessary.  There is, in fact, no shortage of meaningful exceptions in 
civil law, mixed, and fair dealing jurisdictions. When the APEC IP Experts Group 
surveyed exceptions and limitations in the APEC region in 2010, the resulting 204-
page report catalogued quite a wide array of flexibilities addressing purposes similar 
to those mentioned in § 107 that balance the competing interests within those 
countries’ individual legal frameworks.12   
I would submit to you that the burden would have to be on the proponents of 
exporting a fair use style regime to demonstrate that these systems produce some 
externality of over-certainty that harms U.S. jobs, and I don’t think that burden has 
yet been sustained.  On the contrary, there is not at this point a demonstrated need to 
upset countries’ legal systems to incorporate a rather amorphous and sui generis U.S. 
law, developed in the context of specific U.S. constitutional and legal principles.  
And that’s a large part of the reason why we’ve heard resistance to that concept from 
U.S. trading partners, who are only too happy to have exceptions and limitations, and 
to try to vindicate the purposes behind provisions like § 107, but want to be able to 
do that in a context and in a way that makes sense for their own systems.  
Finally, to come back to grounding this in what are really the commercial export 
needs that would be served by exportation of a so-called “flexible norm” like fair use 
in a trade agreement, I think the European experience tends to further contradict the 
notion that uncertainty is necessary for U.S. tech sector companies to thrive in 
overseas markets.  The absence of fair use has not prevented U.S. technology 
companies from, indeed, rising to positions of dominance in foreign markets.  For 
example, the dominant U.S. search engine holds more than 90% market share in the 
EU, which does not have a fair use regime.13  YouTube similarly enjoys large market 
shares outside the United States without the benefit of a fair use-style regime.14   
So, there is room to question the notion that a very broad notion of an exception 
and limitation, as opposed to specific exceptions and limitations that are consistent 
with the three-step test, is fundamentally necessary in order for U.S. companies to 
thrive in foreign markets.  I think with that I’ll stop there and we can leave it for the 
Q&A session to explore some of these issues in more detail.  Thanks. 
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